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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Indonesia’s population size, geographic location and economic potential 
all suggest that it will play a bigger role in international affairs in the 
future than it currently does. The truth is, however, that Indonesia is 
unlikely to emerge as a significantly more influential actor over the next 
five years in ways that set it apart from other middle powers. If Indonesia 
is to achieve great power status, as some observers have suggested, it 
will only do so in the much longer term.  
Nevertheless, it is important to understand what kind of international 
actor Indonesia will be in the short to medium term. Indonesia’s foreign 
policy will be defined by four key features: it will project the image of a 
great power despite its middle power abilities; it will remain non-aligned 
but leaning towards the United States; ASEAN will continue to be a key 
platform for Indonesia’s regional and international aspirations; and it will 
take up Muslim concerns rather than having a distinctly Islamic foreign 
policy. As things stand, Indonesia’s relationship with Australia is unlikely 
to become a foreign policy priority in coming years.  
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Indonesia’s size is often assumed to afford the country an inevitable 
significance in international affairs. Indonesia is the world’s third largest 
democracy, in the top twenty global economies, the most populous 
Muslim-majority country and the fourth most populous country overall. It 
has always been a large country, but its democratic transformation and 
the growth of its economy over the last fifteen years have gained 
Indonesia broader attention.  
A visit to Jakarta features on the itineraries of various world leaders. In 
2013 the Chinese premier Xi Jinping, the Indian prime minister 
Manmohan Singh, and the Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe were all 
visitors to Indonesia's capital. Indonesia enjoys additional prominence 
through its involvement in multilateral forums, including the G20, where it 
casts itself as a representative of developing countries, as well as others 
such as APEC. In think tank and academic circles, much scholarly 
energy is devoted to the prospect of Indonesia rising.1 
Indonesia is aware of its rising prominence in the world. Its new status 
has been a recurring theme in President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 
address to the nation each year to mark the country’s Independence 
Day. In 2011, Yudhoyono told the nation Indonesia had shaken off its 60 
year old tag as a third world country to become an emerging economy.2 
The world increasingly frequently asks, “What does Indonesia think?” on 
global problems, the president said to Indonesians in 2012.3 “Indonesia 
resolves to always be part of the solution to global problems”, he 
remarked in his 2013 speech.4  
In the same vein, the Indonesian public now expects Indonesia to have 
an influence in far-off corners of the globe, according to Indonesian 
foreign affairs officials. Twenty per cent of Indonesians nominated 
Indonesia as one of the ten most influential countries in the world in 
polling conducted by the Lowy Institute in 2011.5 The reports in 2013 that 
Australia had spied on much of Indonesia’s top leadership also provoked 
much public commentary to the effect that Australia needed Indonesia 
more than vice versa, and that Indonesia was stronger militarily. 
Yet, the importance afforded to Indonesia as much reflects its 
anticipated future influence as it does its current power. At present, even 
in relative terms Indonesia is not a great military or economic power, a 
fact that Indonesian officials readily admit. “In terms of military and 
economic muscle ... Jakarta must rely mostly on projecting soft power”, 
judges Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a vice-presidential advisor, although writing 
in her private capacity.6  
Beyond discussion of Indonesia’s future power it is important to 
understand what kind of international actor it will be in the short to 
medium term. This is the key focus of this paper. After a brief overview of 
Indonesia’s political and economic development over the last decade 
and a half, and its implications for Indonesian influence on the regional 
and global stage, the paper sets out four key features that will define 
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Indonesia’s foreign policy. Overall these features will make for an 
Indonesia that is vocal about the way it would like the world around it to 
be, but limited in its ability to bend world affairs to its will.  
A RISING INDONESIA? 
There is no question that Indonesia’s democratisation and its economic 
growth have given the country a greater prominence in regional and 
global affairs. However, its economic growth has not yet given the 
Indonesian state the resources to be a significantly more influential actor 
on the world stage, either diplomatically or militarily. If Indonesia is to 
achieve great power status – and that is not clear – it will only do so in 
the longer term.7   
Indonesia’s political transformation has allowed it to become a more 
outward-looking country, as has its achievement in largely overcoming 
rule. Democratisation has also provided Indonesia with “reformer 
credentials”, in the words of one Indonesian official.8 Accordingly, 
Indonesia’s fifteen years of democratic rule are arguably something of a 
soft-power asset in its relations with other countries undergoing a 
political transition, and with other democratic countries.   
There are clear limits to this soft power, however. In this light, one of the 
leading observers of Indonesian foreign policy, Rizal Sukma, highlights 
Indonesia’s “limited ability to support democracy abroad”. Sukma notes 
Indonesia has neither convinced its neighbours of the merits of 
democracy nor “launch[ed] any democracy-promotion efforts outside its 
Asian comfort zone”.9 Indonesia might claim Myanmar as an exception 
to this characterisation, but it is not clear that Indonesia’s engagement 
there decisively spurred political change.  
Indonesia’s rapid economic growth in recent years has meant that for 
some observers it is no longer a question of whether Indonesia will rise 
but rather how high it will rise. In the last decade the Indonesian 
economy has grown by an average 5.7 per cent per annum.10 By 2012 
Indonesia had grown to become the world’s 16th largest economy in 
2012, up from 27th in 2000.11 That growing economic weight is 
recognised in its membership of the G20. 
The continued expansion of its economy cannot be taken entirely for 
granted however. Poor infrastructure, weak governance, corruption, low-
quality education institutions, an unsophisticated manufacturing sector, 
and under-developed links to the global economy are just some of the 
constraints on growth.12 Nevertheless, it is worth noting, Indonesia’s 
rapid growth to date has taken place in the midst of these constraints. 
Moreover, in terms of economic influence, Indonesia is rising from a low 
base. Indonesian diplomats more typically lament its failure to convert 
political diplomacy into increased market access, rather than talk of how 
Indonesia’s trade relations or economic heft provide political leverage. 
If Indonesia is to achieve 
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Nor is Indonesia a significant or even an emerging donor. By OECD 
estimates, Indonesia spent around $10 million on overseas development 
aid in 2010. By comparison, the OECD estimate for China was 
approximately $2 billion, Brazil $500 million, India $640 million and South 
Africa $118 million.13   
Indonesia’s economic growth has enabled it to increase its military 
budget, but it has done so inconsistently and from a very low base. 
Despite its goal of increasing the defence budget to 1.5 per cent of GDP, 
military spending has remained consistently below 1 per cent of GDP 
and spending may actually have declined in real terms between 2012 
and 2013.14 In absolute terms Indonesia spends around a third as much 
annually as Australia on defence and slightly less than Singapore.15 
Indonesia’s military strength is also constrained by questionable 
procurement and strategic doctrine.16 Observers judge Indonesia will 
likely modernise only in piecemeal fashion over the next decade.17  
Again, it is worth emphasising, continued economic growth would 
provide Indonesia with additional resources to overcome these 
constraints. But this is a process that will take place only over a long 
period. 
FOUR FEATURES OF INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Irrespective of uncertainties over its future power, Indonesia remains 
important both regionally, as Southeast Asia’s largest country, and 
geographically, sitting astride key trade routes. In this regard, it is 
actually more important to understand what kind of regional and 
international actor Indonesia is likely to be in coming years, rather than 
engage in an irresolvable debate over whether Indonesia will be a great 
or middle power. Looked at from this perspective, it is possible to discern 
four broad features that will define Indonesian international policy over 
the next five years.  
PROJECTING THE IMAGE OF A GREAT POWER DESPITE 
MIDDLE POWER ABILITY 
Two conflicting influences underpin Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda. 
The first is an aspiration to be a global player, an ambition deriving from 
the country’s size. The preamble to its constitution mandates Indonesia 
to be outward-looking, tasking the government with “contributing to a 
world order based on independence, permanent peace and social 
justice”, a fact that numerous interviewees from the foreign policy 
community volunteered. Indonesia’s public expects the government to 
be able to influence world events, an aspiration its democratic 
government must respond to. Indonesia has become more outward-
looking since it has become a democracy and addressed the internal 
stability issues of the first years of post-authoritarian rule.18 
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Running counter to this influence, Indonesia’s foreign policy community 
is well aware of the country’s limitations. A senior official told the author 
that Indonesia must accept that it does not have the resources or 
influence to act on a range of foreign policy issues on which the public 
demands action.19 As the previous section underlined, Indonesia’s 
growing economic weight is yet to translate into real diplomatic or military 
influence.  
A clear example of this disconnect between Indonesia’s aspirations and 
its influence is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is strong public 
interest in the issue and a demand that the government be more active 
on it. But the same senior official told the author that because there were 
real limits to Indonesia’s influence, the challenge for the government 
was to be seen to be doing something. The result is evident in 
Indonesia’s diplomacy: Indonesia co-sponsored the Palestinian bid to 
become a full member of the United Nations and of UNESCO, it has 
been vocal in support of Palestinian independence, and it has made 
symbolic gestures of support such as capacity-building programs for 
Palestinians. But none of these steps have had any significant influence 
on the key actors in the conflict. Nor has Indonesia been able to mediate 
between them.20 
Another senior official told the author that this inability to have any 
impact in the Middle East had led Indonesia to focus on issues where he 
asserted it could make a difference, such as nuclear non-proliferation.21 
Indonesia, in part through ASEAN, has pushed for the five 
acknowledged nuclear weapons bearing states to sign a Southeast Asia 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty.22   
The interaction between Indonesia’s foreign policy aspirations and its 
limitations results in a far-reaching (and sometimes over-reaching) 
international agenda that is prosecuted with limited means. 
Unsurprisingly, a number of interviewees from Indonesia’s foreign policy 
community cited the ‘power of ideas’ as one of the key ways in which 
Indonesia could influence world affairs. Indeed, some of the main foreign 
policy successes highlighted by interviewees were Indonesian ideas that 
were adopted over those of other countries. One example given was the 
East Asia Summit (EAS) being formed as an ASEAN+6 rather than 
ASEAN+3 member organisation, reflecting Indonesia’s desire to add 
more countries to balance China, as opposed to China’s preference to 
keep the forum small. In a similar vein, President Yudhoyono’s 
appointment to the high-level panel on the post-2015 development 
agenda was also cited as an example of how Indonesian ideas were 
valued by others on the global stage. 
Will a ‘power of ideas’ approach be sufficient to satisfy Indonesian public 
expectations for influence? As long as Indonesia does not face a 
genuine external crisis that exposes its lack of influence, the answer is 
almost certainly yes. Such an approach will not entirely satisfy the 
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electorate, but nor does it loom as the decisive factor in public 
perceptions of Indonesia’s government. Indonesia’s foreign policy 
effectiveness is, by and large, not going to decisively change the way 
Indonesians vote – at least not any time soon.  
NON-ALIGNED, BUT LEANING TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES 
Indonesia has entered into comprehensive partnerships with both the 
United States and China, but will not form an alliance with either. Non-
alignment is a core principle of Indonesia’s ‘free and active’ foreign 
policy, and a national point of pride. Illustrative of this pride, interviewees 
took the chance to criticise Australia’s formal alliance with the United 
States, with one saying Indonesia did not need to bring in US Marines to 
secure it, in a reference to the marine deployment in Darwin.23 Another 
advised Australia to be more independent of the United States in its 
foreign policy.24 Non-alignment allows Indonesia to maintain the 
pretence that it can influence each of these larger powers, although in 
practice its ability to influence either is rather more limited. 
Both the United States and China have a history of turbulent relations 
with Indonesia. Tensions with the United States were at their highest 
during the rule of founding president Sukarno, in power from 1945 until 
1967. The United States saw Sukarno’s policy of non-alignment and 
accommodation of communist activism in Indonesia as a threat to its 
interests.25 It supported regional rebellions and condoned the massacre 
of an estimated 500,000 people accused as communists in 1965-56.26 
Ties with Sukarno’s successor, the authoritarian president Suharto, were 
stronger. One former senior official claimed to the author that Indonesia 
was only “relatively” non-aligned during this period, owing to its 
closeness to Washington.27 Nevertheless, the United States restricted 
security cooperation in the 1990s in response to the regime’s human 
rights violations. In the case of China, the stridently anti-communist 
Suharto suspended diplomatic relations altogether between 1967 and 
1990. Various bans on the use of the Chinese language and cultural 
practices within Indonesia were only lifted after Suharto fell from power 
in 1998.28  
Since the advent of democratic rule, Indonesia has expanded and 
formalised ties with both countries. With the United States, the war on 
terror was a key driver. US restrictions on security cooperation were 
relaxed, culminating in a comprehensive partnership agreement in 
2010.29 The war on terror did however initially turn Indonesian public 
attitudes against the United States, reflecting a belief that America was 
prosecuting a war on Muslims. By the time the partnership agreement 
was signed, however, attitudes had softened.  
Indonesia has had a strong incentive to strengthen ties with Beijing, in 
view of China’s striking growth in economic and strategic weight. In 1990 
China had a per capita GDP roughly two-thirds of Indonesia’s; by 2007, 
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Indonesia’s per capita GDP was two-thirds of China’s.30 Indonesia and 
China concluded a strategic partnership in 2005, then upgraded this 
agreement to a comprehensive strategic partnership during President Xi 
Jinping’s 2013 Jakarta visit.31 Scholars have questioned the degree to 
which this agreement reflects an actual substantive partnership, 
however.32 One illustration of its limits is the fact that the highest annual 
meeting between the two countries takes place below the heads-of-
government level.33 
Neither partnership agreement spells the end of bilateral tensions. 
Although the Indonesian government has overall not opposed the United 
States rebalance to Asia, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa’s first 
response in 2011 to the announcement of plans to deploy 2500 US 
Marines to Darwin was terse. Leaked information from former NSA 
contractor Edward Snowden that showed that the US Embassy in 
Jakarta was engaging in electronic eavesdropping also caused serious 
tensions in the relationship. Senior cabinet ministers described the 
reported spying as “unfriendly” and out of step with bilateral ties.34  
Nevertheless, Indonesia’s foreign policy community is significantly more 
wary of China than the United States. This wariness of China derives in 
part from specific incidents, including periodic confrontations over the 
Indonesian arrest of Chinese fishermen or seizure of boats in its waters. 
The perceived contribution of Chinese meddling to disunity within 
ASEAN is another factor, for instance in the failure of ASEAN ministers 
to conclude a ministerial communiqué in their 2012 meeting in Phnom 
Penh.35 There is also an economic dimension to this wariness. Several 
interviewees highlighted Chinese imports as a threat to Indonesia’s 
economy.  
Uncertainty regarding future Chinese intentions in the region also 
underpins Indonesia’s disquiet. One senior foreign affairs official 
remarked that Indonesia knows pax americana and has no complaints 
about it at all, whereas things are less certain with China.36 Another 
senior member of the foreign policy community noted that the decision to 
include India, Australia, and New Zealand in the East Asia Summit 
reflected unease at how China may act when it has economic, political, 
and military supremacy in the region. As one senior official noted, “China 
enjoys the term peaceful rise, but how long will China continue to be 
peaceful?”37 
Such unease with China is not universal. Vice presidential adviser Dewi 
Fortuna Anwar, for example, expressed the opinion that mutual 
interdependence would render coming strategic competition less severe 
than in the 1950s and 1960s.38 But such is the wariness of China that in 
interviews with the author various political opponents of current 
presidential election frontrunners Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto 
sought to tarnish their foreign policy credentials by claiming each would 
carry Indonesia closer to China. 
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Notwithstanding the preference for the United States, Indonesia’s 
strategy towards Asia’s established and rising powers has been to bind 
each in multilateral institutions. In particular, the East Asia Summit aims 
to balance China’s heft, both in its original ASEAN+6 form (ASEAN plus 
China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India) and 
particularly since the addition of the United States and Russia in 2011. 
The East Asia Summit has been witheringly criticised for its 
ineffectiveness, but it could conceivably provide the opportunity to 
moderate competition between the United States and China.39 The 
forum is unlikely to do much to moderate either power’s behaviour when 
their core interests are at stake, however. 
Indeed, one senior Indonesian official described his country’s diplomacy 
in response to China and the United States as akin to running on the 
spot. It is hardly unique in this respect. Nor though would aligning 
formally with either power strengthen Indonesia’s influence. 
ASEAN AS A PLATFORM FOR A WIDER REGIONAL AND GLOBAL 
ROLE 
ASEAN centrality is a permanent feature of Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
No one the author spoke to suggested this centrality was something a 
new president might change. ASEAN covers Indonesia’s immediate 
geographic region, where its interests are most directly engaged. In 
diplomatic terms, ‘ASEAN-plus’ forums such as the East Asia Summit 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum provide a stepping stone for Indonesia 
to attempt a wider regional and global role. Indeed, an adviser to 
President Yudhoyono described the EAS as a way for Indonesia to 
expand its stable surrounding environment beyond ASEAN, in a “natural 
progression of our interests”.40 Moreover, the EAS is the only forum that 
brings the US president to the region on an annual basis, as one official 
observed, and squares with Indonesia’s preference for multilateral 
approaches to the United States and China. 
ASEAN centrality does have clear drawbacks. Indonesia expects to play 
a leadership role within ASEAN − an expectation many external parties 
share. In reality, however, even as Southeast Asia’s largest country it 
cannot dictate an agenda to the grouping. Indonesia’s proposals for an 
ASEAN Security Community and regional human rights body were each 
heavily watered down prior to adoption, for instance, reflecting the fact 
that regional instruments must gain the agreement of the other, mostly 
authoritarian, member governments.41 ASEAN unity is also crucial to the 
grouping’s effectiveness, but it has struggled to remain cohesive in its 
stance on the South China Sea dispute. Most notably, the grouping 
failed for the first time to issue a joint communiqué at its ministerial 
meeting in Phnom Penh in 2012.42 Internally, the grouping has also 
proved unable to resolve contentious issues. It will miss its target to 
establish an ASEAN community by 2015. ASEAN attempts to resolve a 
border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia also failed, with the two 
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countries asking the International Court of Justice to adjudicate.43 
Notably, Indonesia was chair of ASEAN at the time of the association’s 
unsuccessful attempt to mediate this conflict. 
Indonesia has few options but to persist with ASEAN-centred diplomacy, 
even if this constrains Indonesian diplomacy to some degree. Indonesia 
has been unable to exert consistent influence on a broader stage in its 
own right. It would be curious if it sought to step away from the East Asia 
Summit so soon after its expansion in 2011 to include the United States 
and Russia.  
A MUSLIM FOREIGN POLICY RATHER THAN AN ISLAMIC ONE 
In the same way that Indonesia is a majority Muslim country rather than 
an Islamic one, Indonesia’s foreign policy will take up Muslim concerns 
rather than be driven by Islamic principles.  
As a country in which a majority of the people are Muslims, Indonesia 
does pay extra attention to international conflicts involving Muslim 
populations, even if its diplomats do not name Muslim-majority countries 
in particular as among Indonesia’s most important relations. For 
example, conflicts in the Middle East occupy a prominent place in 
Indonesian foreign policy rhetoric. Various foreign policy actors attribute 
this prominence variously to the presence of large numbers of 
Indonesian migrant workers in the region, Muslim solidarity, and historic 
ties with particular countries. Senior foreign affairs officials nominated the 
Middle East as a region where Indonesia would like to be influential, 
although it is not.44 For example, President Yudhoyono devoted a third of 
the foreign policy section of his 2013 Independence Day speech to the 
Palestinian question, Syria, and Egypt.  
Indonesia’s status as the largest Muslim majority country in the world 
does not, however, provide it with any additional sway in the Middle 
East. As Martin van Bruinessen argues, the Muslim countries of the 
Middle East tend to look upon Indonesia as peripheral to the Muslim 
world, and no Islamic movement or scholar of international note 
emanates from Indonesia.45 Consistent with this judgment, Indonesians 
who contend that Indonesia can increase its influence among Muslim-
majority countries cite its democratisation as its key asset. The head of 
the parliament’s foreign affairs commission, Mahfudz Siddiq, is one to 
express this view, arguing Indonesia can capitalise on its experience to 
forge ties with the new political actors that have emerged as a result of 
the Arab spring.46 
Closer to home, Indonesia has also sought to intercede in regional 
conflicts involving Southeast Asian Muslim populations. In the Southern 
Philippines, Indonesia offered to broker peace talks following renewed 
violence in September 2013, after mediating an earlier peace agreement 
in the region in 1996.47 Despite this offer, it has in fact been Malaysia 
that has acted as mediator in this conflict in recent years, playing this 
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role in the talks that resulted in the Bangsamoro Framework Agreement 
in late 2012. Malaysia is also currently mediating talks on the Southern 
Thailand conflict, after Indonesian-hosted talks between the parties in 
2008 failed to reach a settlement.48 Violence against Rohingya Muslims 
in Myanmar has attracted Indonesia’s attention, as well as the attention 
of Indonesian jihadis who have attempted retaliatory terror attacks. 
Indonesia has been able to do little on the issue beyond making 
concerned statements. President Yudhoyono raised the issue during his 
state visit to Naypyidaw in 2013. Indonesia also prompted a joint ASEAN 
ministerial statement on the Rohingya in 2012.49   
Dewi Fortuna Anwar characterises Islam as playing primarily a limiting 
role on Indonesian foreign policy, making certain positions untenable for 
the Indonesian government, notably diplomatic relations with Israel.50 
One issue where Indonesia has taken an Islamic stance has been its 
support for an international instrument to prevent blasphemy. President 
Yudhoyono used his address to the United Nations General Assembly in 
September 2012 to call for “an international instrument to effectively 
prevent incitement to hostility or violence based on religions or beliefs”.51 
Yudhoyono made specific reference to the film “Innocence of Muslims”, 
a 13-minute YouTube video derogatory of Islam and which spurred 
sometimes violent protests in a number of majority-Muslim countries.52 
Yudhoyono was, however, careful to phrase his support for an 
international instrument in secular terms, citing restrictions on the 
freedom of expression in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
The four features outlined above detail some of Indonesia’s core foreign 
policy priorities, but the list is not meant to be exhaustive. The imperative 
to protect its citizens abroad, in particular, might have been included as 
an additional feature. Indonesia faces a particularly serious challenge in 
this regard, with five million of its citizens registered as living abroad and 
many others likely to be also living overseas, often in vulnerable 
circumstances.53 The plight of female migrant workers has been of acute 
political salience. The execution of Ruyati binti Satubi in Saudi Arabia in 
2011, for example, caused immediate public uproar in Indonesia and 
spurred the government to form an ad hoc taskforce to handle cases of 
Indonesians facing the death penalty overseas.54 More recently, the trial 
in Malaysia of young migrant worker Wilfrida Soik for murder has 
attracted national attention, including presidential aspirant Prabowo 
Subianto travelling to Malaysia on multiple occasions to attend her trial.55  
The great uncertainty in Indonesia’s foreign policy is this year’s 
presidential elections. Of the two frontrunners, Jakarta governor Joko 
Widodo is an unknown, having never held a national position. He would 
be unlikely to significantly shift Indonesia’s foreign policy, given it is 
probably not a particular interest for him. Indeed, his party chairperson 
Megawati Soekarnoputri is widely held to have delegated her foreign 
policy to her foreign minister when she was president, and it may be that 
Widodo does the same.56  
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Prabowo Subianto, a former authoritarian-era general with a chequered 
human rights record, would be a different proposition as president. He is 
now a populist nationalist party head, running on his image as a firm 
leader.57 He has engaged in a charm offensive with the international 
media, and as president could foreseeably make pragmatic gestures in 
an attempt to ameliorate international unease about himself. (Whether 
he would be able to visit all Western countries as president remains an 
open question − he is currently banned from visiting the United States on 
human rights grounds.) There is concern, however, that he might 
attempt a more assertive and uncompromising foreign policy, or try to 
wind back some of Indonesia’s democratic reforms. But the same lack of 
resources that constrains Indonesia’s global agenda would also prevent 
a Prabowo-led Indonesia from becoming a more assertive regional 
power. 
WILL RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA BECOME A 
FEATURE OF INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY?  
Against the background of recent tumult in the Australia-Indonesia 
relationship it is worth considering where Australia is likely to sit in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities. Australia has featured in Indonesian 
public discourse to an uncommon degree over the past year, not always 
for positive reasons. The removal of a sitting prime minister by party 
colleagues in July 2013 piqued interest within Indonesia in Australia’s 
political system. The change of government in Australia in September 
2013 received ample media coverage and the new Australian prime 
minister Tony Abbott met with President Yudhoyono at the end of that 
month. Rows over asylum seekers and particularly over espionage also 
received saturation coverage in the Indonesian media in the latter half of 
2013 and drew comment from the highest levels of government. Barely a 
month has passed in which Foreign Minister Natalegawa has not 
commented on bilateral ties.  
Despite all this added attention, as things stand it is unlikely that the 
bilateral relationship with Australia will become a key feature of 
Indonesian foreign policy in coming years. It is an oft-cited fact that 
Australia maintains its largest overseas embassy in Jakarta, whereas 
Jakarta concentrates its diplomatic resources elsewhere. Indonesia’s 
more immediate strategic challenges and larger trading partners lie to its 
north. As a result, outside of periodic bilateral spats, Australia can 
appear invisible in Indonesian foreign policy discussions. Meetings 
between the two countries’ leaders typically pass without comment in 
the opinion and editorial pages of the Indonesian-language press, 
whereas they have become occasions for assessments of the bilateral 
relationship in the Australian media. Nor is there any equivalent in 
Indonesia of the centres for the academic study of Indonesia in various 
Australian universities. 
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Running counter to this trend, President Yudhoyono has been 
consistently open to more intensive ties with Australia during his two 
terms as president. Several of his most senior cabinet members 
undertook postgraduate study in Australia as well. Yudhoyono 
addressed the Australian parliament during a bilateral visit in 2010, and 
during his tenure the two countries have established an annual leaders’ 
meeting, as well as an annual defence and foreign ministers’ summit.  
Yudhoyono has, however, now entered his final year in power, and each 
of his most likely prospective successors pose a challenge for ties with 
Australia. Joko Widodo’s stance on Australia is unclear, as is his overall 
foreign policy, whereas Prabowo would be a controversial figure within 
Australia. He may even be unable to travel to Australia because of his 
human rights record. Compounding this in the short term at least has 
been the damage done to the relationship by the spying row. It has 
provoked widespread commentary in Indonesia (but also Australia) to 
the effect that Australia needs Indonesia more than vice versa. Richard 
Tanter, in a considered account of the spying row and its fallout, 
describes the relationship as fundamentally “asymmetrical”, and claims 
that “at least some Australian senior political figures” now realise this 
fact.58 Within Indonesia, similar claims of such an asymmetry have often 
been part of calls for the government to take a firm stance against 
Australia over the espionage revelations.  
What the spying row actually exposed, however, is that neither country 
can exert much leverage over the other. In response to the spying crisis 
Indonesia swiftly suspended information and intelligence sharing, joint 
military exercises, and people smuggling cooperation. But doing so does 
not provide Indonesia with leverage, and has not elicited any meaningful 
concessions from Australia in the bilateral consultations that have 
followed the row. On security issues that are not genuine priorities for 
Indonesia, such as people smuggling, bilateral cooperation prior to the 
row was not producing the policy outcomes that Australia desired in any 
event. Law enforcement cooperation between Australia and Indonesia 
on people smuggling was not able to hold back the massive increase in 
asylum boat departures from Indonesia in 2012 and the first half of 2013, 
for example. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that law enforcement 
spurred the great decrease in boat arrivals since July 2013, which 
instead appears attributable to new Papua New Guinea- and Nauru-
based policies that do not involve Indonesia. The suspension of 
cooperation in these areas, although unwelcome, has therefore not 
significantly shifted the policy landscape. On the issues that are common 
priorities for both Indonesia and Australia, such as terrorism, Indonesia 
has not ceased enforcing the law within its borders, nor would it ever do 
so because of a disagreement with Australia. 
The fact of ‘mutual non-leverage’ hardly in itself makes relations with 
Australia a prominent feature of Indonesian foreign policy either, of 
course. For that to happen, Australia and Indonesia would need to forge 
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closer cooperation on broader issues of mutual concern. Developing 
such cooperation requires trust, something that the espionage row has 
significantly eroded. 
CONCLUSION – AN INVESTMENT FOR THE FUTURE 
Indonesia clearly aspires to play an active and influential role in regional 
and global affairs, but in the short term lacks the resources to flex its 
muscles in support of its foreign policy ideas. Although its foreign policy 
community knows Indonesia’s international limitations, its public expects 
broader influence. These circumstances see Indonesia voicing foreign 
policy stances on the Middle East and Muslim populations around the 
world, on democratisation, on global issues like post-Millennium 
Development Goals development, and generally doing so in multilateral 
settings. 
This provides something of an opportunity for other countries seeking to 
engage with Indonesia. By engaging on regional and global issues that 
are important to Indonesia and help it be seen as a global player, 
prospective partner countries such as Australia can build trust and 
relationships that will make their overall bilateral relationship with 
Indonesia more robust. This is a long-term investment, however. 
Indonesia is not going to change over the next five years in ways that set 
it apart from other middle powers, even if its population size, geographic 
location, and economic growth potential all point to an upward trajectory. 
As a foreign policy actor, Indonesia is not quite the next big thing. 
Engagement now with Indonesia is an investment in the future. For now, 
when it comes to foreign policy, Jakarta is talking the talk more often 
than it is walking the walk. 
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